jmcqueen
2eb31a2ddc
Introduces a new diagnostic command that walks a registry of check
modules against a store user's Webex Calling configuration and
surfaces per-issue adaptive-card remediation for the fixable ones.
Checks (services/voiceDiag/checks/): dnd, callForwarding, callWaiting,
callIntercept, voicemail, hoteling, executiveAssistant,
outgoingPermission, phoneOnline. Remediations offered for DND,
forwarding, waiting, and intercept.
Uses the /v1/people/{id}/features/* admin surface (spark-admin:people_read
+ spark-admin:people_write scopes we already hold) — the earlier
telephony/config/people/*/callSettings/* path scheme returns 404 from
the Webex gateway and is not a live surface. Runner distinguishes
routing-404s ("URL moved") from "not applicable" 404s ("no calling
license") via the response body.
Arg parser accepts detail/detailed/--detail/--detailed and normalises
macOS smart-dashes so --detailed doesn't die when auto-correct
turns it into an em-dash.
Wires a VOICEDIAG_ACTIONS dispatcher in index.js mirroring the IGMP
branch, and registers /voicediag in commands/registry.js. 170 tests
pass (52 new: 39 check + 12 renderer + 5 arg-normalization).
Docs updated in .env.example, services/phoneService.js:467, and a new
services/voiceDiag/README.md that includes a "how to add a check"
recipe plus a note on the earlier wrong URL scheme.
Co-authored-by: Cursor <cursoragent@cursor.com>
98 lines
3.4 KiB
JavaScript
98 lines
3.4 KiB
JavaScript
// src/services/voiceDiag/checks/outgoingPermission.js
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//
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// Info-only check for outgoing call permissions. Extends the
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// count-only surface currently in `/phonestatus` with per-rule
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// detail. When a call type is set to BLOCK (rather than ALLOW /
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// AUTH_CODE / TRANSFER), users on that line can't dial calls of that
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// class. Blocked domestic-toll or international are especially
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// common tickets ("we can't dial out from the store"), so we flag
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// those as a warning.
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//
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// Endpoint: GET /v1/people/{personId}/features/outgoingPermission
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// Scope: spark-admin:people_read
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// Response shape:
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// {
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// useCustomEnabled: boolean,
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// callingPermissions: [
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// { callType: 'INTERNAL_CALL' | 'LOCAL' | 'TOLL_FREE' | 'TOLL' |
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// 'NATIONAL' | 'INTERNATIONAL' | 'OPERATOR_ASSISTED' |
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// 'CHARGEABLE_DIRECTORY_ASSISTED' | 'SPECIAL_SERVICES_I'|II |
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// 'PREMIUM_SERVICES_I'|II | 'CASUAL',
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// action: 'ALLOW' | 'BLOCK' | 'AUTH_CODE' | 'TRANSFER_NUMBER_1'..3,
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// transferEnabled: boolean }
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// ]
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// }
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//
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// When `useCustomEnabled=false` the account defers to the site's
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// default outgoing permission set — in that case there's nothing
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// user-scoped to report, so we return OK with a note.
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const ENDPOINT = (personId) =>
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`people/${personId}/features/outgoingPermission`;
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// Call types that being BLOCKED tends to be a bug for a store line.
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// Others (premium/casual/operator) are almost always intentionally
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// blocked, so blocking them is fine.
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const HIGH_IMPACT_CALL_TYPES = new Set([
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'LOCAL',
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'NATIONAL',
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'TOLL_FREE',
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'TOLL',
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'INTERNATIONAL',
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]);
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export const outgoingPermissionCheck = {
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id: 'outgoingPermission',
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label: 'Outgoing Call Permissions',
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requires: ['personId'],
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scope: 'spark-admin:people_read',
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async run(ctx) {
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const data = await ctx.webex.request('GET', ENDPOINT(ctx.personId));
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const useCustomEnabled = !!data?.useCustomEnabled;
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const rules = Array.isArray(data?.callingPermissions) ? data.callingPermissions : [];
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if (!useCustomEnabled) {
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return {
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status: 'ok',
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message: 'Using the location default outgoing permission set (no user override).',
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details: { useCustomEnabled, rules },
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remediation: null,
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};
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}
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const blocked = rules
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.filter((r) => r?.action === 'BLOCK')
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.map((r) => r.callType);
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const highImpactBlocked = blocked.filter((t) => HIGH_IMPACT_CALL_TYPES.has(t));
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if (highImpactBlocked.length > 0) {
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return {
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status: 'warn',
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message:
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`Custom outgoing permissions are set and the following high-impact call types ` +
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`are BLOCKED: ${highImpactBlocked.join(', ')}. Users on this line will hear a fast-busy for those calls.`,
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details: { useCustomEnabled, rules, blocked, highImpactBlocked },
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remediation: null,
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};
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}
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if (blocked.length > 0) {
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return {
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status: 'ok',
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message: `Custom outgoing permissions with ${blocked.length} blocked call type(s): ${blocked.join(', ')}. None are high-impact.`,
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details: { useCustomEnabled, rules, blocked, highImpactBlocked: [] },
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remediation: null,
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};
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}
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return {
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status: 'ok',
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message: `Custom outgoing permissions (${rules.length} rules) — nothing is blocked.`,
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details: { useCustomEnabled, rules, blocked: [], highImpactBlocked: [] },
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remediation: null,
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};
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},
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};
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